Normative Reference Magnets by Williams, JRG
This is an author produced version of Normative Reference Magnets.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/117576/
Article:
Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2017) Normative Reference Magnets. 
Philosophical Review. ISSN 0031-8108 (In Press) 
© 2017. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in The 
Philosophical Review. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. 
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
   Page 1 of 36 
Normative Reference Magnets 
J Robert G Williams  
Abstract 
The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by 
moral twin earth cases. This paper offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a 
metaphysics of content : Ç substantive È radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This 
story is distinguished from extant Ç reference magnetic È explanations of the phenomenon, and objections 
and replies considered.  
 
 
Part I: THE REFERENTIAL STABILITY PUZZLE.  
 
Some say that the concept moral wrongness has a distinctive referential stability. Environment, 
society and moral opinion may vary dramatically, and yet agents will succeed in thinking about a 
common subject matter, right and wrong, so long as deliberation and sentiments are internally 
regulated in the right way. Schematically: there is a property P, applying to actions, which our 
concept of moral wrongness picks out, and there is also a conceptual role R which our concept of 
moral wrongness plays. The referential stability thesis is the following: necessarily if an agent has a 
concept W that plays role R, then W denotes P.1  
 
Whether moral wrongness is really referentially stable in this way is a matter of dispute. This paper 
offers something to those on both sides of the issue. To those who endorse stability, I offer a 
theory of content that explains this puzzling phenomenon, and so by their lights a piece of 
evidence in favour of that theory of content. The explanation will be compatible with metaethical 
positions such as synthetic reductionism and non-naturalism, so demonstrates their compatibility 
with referential stability. Those who reject stability are free to read the derivation to follow as a 
reductio of the theory of content I develop. Either way, we make progress. 
 
1.1!The stability thesis  
                                                
1
 In fact, the statement will be refined in section 4.1.  
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Stability says: necessarily, if an agent has a concept W that plays role R, then W denotes property 
P. But what is the concept W? What role R features in the stability thesis? Which property P ends 
up denoted? IÕll take these questions in reverse order.  
 
The property P is the property of being morally wrong. In order to have a concrete thesis to work 
with, I take a particular candidate specification as a working assumption. I henceforth assume, with 
the Kantians, that P is the property violating of the categorical imperative. 
 
R is the conceptual role of wrongness. A (conceptual) role is a possible pattern in the causes and 
causal consequences of tokening some concept. I again make a working assumption, drawing on 
the tradition which connects moral judgements to (moralized) reactive emotions. I henceforth 
assume that for W to play role R is: for the judgement that an agentÕs action is W makes one blame 
the agent for so acting (absent a judgment that they have an excuse); and for the judgement that 
the agentÕs action is not W inhibits one from blaming them.2 
 
In the stability thesis, W ranges over concepts. I take these to be vehicles of mental representation, 
causally efficacious types which are tokened when we make judgements. I do not need to assume 
that such types have their conceptual roles essentially (or even that every concept has a 
conceptual role). The stability thesis, as I understand it here, is silent on whether the tie between 
the concept of moral wrongness and the wrongness conceptual role is necessary, necessary-
                                                
2
 A presupposition must be that blame, strictly speaking, is an emotion linked specifically to morally 
wrongness, and that Òepistemic blameÓ, or Òblaming oneselfÓ for a prudentially unwise but morally okay 
course of action are loose speech. If that is denied, then more work would be required in order to narrow 
down the sentiment to its specifically moral instances. For discussion of this tradition (traced to Mill (1863)), 
see Darwall (2010) on reactive emotions and moral concepts. Compare Skorupski (2010), p. 292: ÒIt is 
morally wrong for x to A iff, were x to A from the beliefs that are warranted in xÕs epistemic state then either x 
would be blameworthy for A-ing, or extenuating circumstances would apply to xÕs A-ingÓ (for Skorupski, 
blameworthiness is the existence of sufficient reason to feel the sentiment of blame (cf. p. 295)). Skorupski 
here offers a biconditional analysis, rather than (directly) a description of a conceptual role. There is a 
connection to (versions of) the conceptual role described, however, for agents who accept the equivalence 
and feel the way that they judge they have reason to feel. There is a closely related analysis in Gibbard 
(1990, p. 43): Òwhat a person does is morally wrong if and only if it is rational for him to feel guilty for having 
done it, and for others to be angry at him for having done itÓÑexcept that Gibbard uses ÒangerÓ where 
Skorupski uses blame (and identifies guilt with self-blame).   
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assuming-rationality, or entirely contingent. It simply asserts the conditional: if a concept plays the 
relevant role, it picks out wrongness. (Thus a motivational externalist can agree with stability as I 
have formulated it). 
 
In sum, IÕll be working with the following concrete version of the referential stability thesis:  
 
Necessarily, if an agent has some concept W, such that for any act A: 
- when the agent judges xÕs A-ing to be W, this makes them blame x for A-ing (unless they 
judge that the agent had an excuse);  
and 
 - when the agent judges xÕs A-ing not to be W, this prevents them blaming x for A-ing;  
then  
 - W picks out the property of violating the categorical imperative.  
 
Different views about the distinctive role played by the moral wrongness concept, or about what it 
is for an act to be morally wrong, will lead to rival versions of the stability thesis.3 The reader might 
doubt whether the particular working assumptions I have made are correct. This will not matter. 
The core argument to be given can be stated schematically, in terms of any role R and property P, 
and will be valid for any way of filling these in. The reason for making the working assumptions is 
simply heuristic: a concrete instance will be easier to digest and evaluate. But if, for example, the 
reader endorses classic hedonistic utiliarianism, and a conceptual role that focuses on first-
personal deliberation rather than reactive emotion,4 they are invited to check that the argument still 
                                                
3
 I say ÒrivalÓ, but in fact, due to the conditional nature of the thesis, one might endorse multiple stability 
thesesÑa variety of conceptual roles, playing any of which is sufficient for denoting moral wrongness. 
4
 Wedgwood (2001) offers a first-pass suggestion for a conceptual role for moral wrongness: that the 
judgement that x is morally wrong leads to the judgement that not doing x is (all things considered) better 
than doing x. Wedgwood also considers variants of this role which do not make judgements of moral 
wrongness overriding. Though Skorupski as cited above offers a normative-sentimentalist analysis of 
wrongness, he argues that moral judgements have an overriding role in practical deliberation, by leaning on 
a connection between reasons to feel blame and reasons to act (op. cit. pp. 298-299). Scanlon (2007) 
emphasizes the first-personal deliberative role in his discussions of the concept of moral wrongness, though 
he emphasizes a Òhigher-orderÓ role in which (possibly implicit) beliefs about what is right and wrong control 
how other, more specific considerations figure in deliberation.  
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goes through on their preferred substitutions. I will flag points at which these differences may 
matter.  
 
1.2 Why stability? 
I will presuppose in what follows that stability holds, and that the challenge is to predict and explain 
that datum (although in section 4.1, I propose a refinement of stability). Foes of stability will need to 
recast what I establish as a conditional connection between a certain metaphysics of 
representation and stability, which they tollens where others ponens. I will not try to defend stability 
itself here. But to understand the view, it is useful to know the reasons that friends of stability have 
(or think they have) for endorsing it. Accordingly, I here recap the Ômoral twin earthÕ case that 
motivates many (Horgan & Timmons 1992; also see Hare 1952. For recent dissent and references 
to the literature, see Dowell forthcoming). 
 
Suppose the citizens of Utilitas are disposed to blame other agents for taking hedonically 
suboptimal options. The citizens of Kantopia, on the other hand, blame other agents when they 
take actions that they cannot will as a general law. We fill in the scenario so each citizen has a 
concept W (ÒwrongÓ) that is linked to blame in the way described earlier. The epistemic conditions 
under which they judge that the concept is instantiated varies by citizenship. Crucially, we are 
invited to agree that when a citizen of Kantopia tokens Òit is W to kill an innocent to save many 
livesÓ, and a representative of Utilitas tokens Òit is not W to kill an innocent to save many livesÓ, the 
two have conflicting views on a common topic.  If that is indeed the case, there can be no 
equivocation in what their respective concepts of wrongness denote: there is some P that they both 
pick out. This is so even though their views on the extension of W, and so their suggestions as to 
what property P might be, are diametrically opposed. (On our working assumption, P is the 
property of violating the categorical imperative, so the KantopianÕs moral theory is largely true, 
while the citizens of Utilitas go wrong.) 
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A specific Òtwin earthÓ thought experiment such as this supports an instance of the universally 
quantified referential stability thesis, and referential stability in full generality will be supported if 
analogous verdicts are accepted for other communities (including ourselves) who have a concept 
W that plays the blame-centric role.  
 
1.3 Plan 
In this paper I will be presenting a metaphysics of mental representation that predicts and explains 
stability in the concept wrongness. I then argue (pace recent literature) that nearby rivals fail this 
test, and consider objections and replies.  
 
Section 2 of this paper proposes an explanation of the stability thesis. 2.1 introduces radical 
interpretation; 2.2 articulates the version of it advocated (substantive, realist radical interpretation) 
and 2.3 applies this to explain referential stability.  
 
Section 3 puts the discussion into the wider context of the theory of content. 3.1 compares the 
present version of radical interpretation to one often attributed to David Lewis, which has recently 
been deployed to explain stability. 3.2 presents objections to this rival theory, and shows the 
present account is not subject to these objections. 3.3 explains how an approximation to the 
folklore version of Lewis arises on my own favoured view, and uses this to give a common 
explanation covering both why metaphysically basic descriptive properties (greenness, charge) 
and normatively central properties (wrongness, personhood) are Ònormative reference magnetsÓ. 
  
Section 4 consists of replies to objections, leading to refinements of the referential stability thesis 
itself and clarifying the role that first-order normative theory and normative psychology play in the 
argument.  
 
 
PART II: EXPLAINING STABILITY 
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2.1 A framework for an explanation: radical interpretation 
Abstract interpretations of someoneÑfunctions that map stages of that person to intentional mental 
statesÑare ten a penny. There is one abstract interpretation that maps your current stage to a 
belief that the Earth is run by the lizard people; another that attributes an overwhelming ambition to 
count the grains of sand in the Sahara. Most of these abstract interpretations bear no relation to 
what you actually believe or desire, and make no sense of what you say and do. Still, somewhere 
amongst them is an abstract interpretation that gets things right. 
 
A metaphysics of mental representation M will give a story in two parts. In the first part, M gives 
details about this space of abstract interpretations. What kinds of things get interpreted, most 
fundamentally? Is it whole temporal slices of persons, or does a person at a time have an attitude 
in virtue of being in a state that is mapped to that contentful attitude? Do our interpretations ascribe 
flat-out beliefs and desires, degrees of belief and degrees of desire, or both? What attitude-types, 
other than belief and desire, does an interpretation ascribe? In the second part, M gives an 
illuminating account of what the world has to be like for one of these abstract interpretations to be 
correct (and such an account will be reductive if it does not invoke representational states). It is a 
platitude, more or less, that an abstract interpretation is correct iff the mental states it ascribes are 
exactly those the agent is in; but this biconditional is not an illuminating or reductive 
characterization of correctness, so it is not something we can slot into M as an analysis of 
correctness. However, once we do have a full version of M to hand, we can use this biconditional 
to convert MÕs metaphysical analysis of correctness, whatever it may be, into a metaphysical 
analysis of the facts concerning your mental states: an agent x (at t) believes that p iff the correct 
abstract interpretation maps x-at-t to a belief that p.  
 
The particular metaphysics I will be proposing is a version of radical interpretation. The radical 
interpretation take on correctness, to a first approximation, is the following:  
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 The correct interpretation of an agent x is that one which best accounts for xÕs dispositions 
 to act in the light of the courses of experience x undergoes.  
 
As I develop the theory, ÔactionsÕ and ÔexperiencesÕ are working primitives in this metaphysical 
story. I will assume that these notions are understood in representational terms. The possibility of a 
full reduction of the representational to the non-representational thus depends on the availability of 
a reductive theory of the content of actions and experiences. What my version of radical 
interpretation offers is a transformation of a basic kind of Òsource intentionalityÓ (the proximal ways 
in which agent and world interact representationally, i.e. actions and experiences) into the 
Òsecondary intentionalityÓ of beliefs and desires (see Pautz 2013). With that starting point 
acknowledged, the core question that distinguishes different flavours of radical interpretation is 
how we should understand the notion of Òbest accountingÓ. 
 
Here is a famous and familiar proposal: understand Òbest accounting for xÓ as Òbest structural 
rationalization of xÓ. The correct interpretation of an agent would attribute beliefs and desires that 
are rational responses to her experiences on the one hand, and provide means-end 
rationalizations of her actions on the other. The rational constraints here would be ÒstructuralÓ in 
that theyÕre insensitive to particular contents of attitudes involved, constraining only the patterns of 
attitudes and perhaps their logical form. For a concrete example of this, consider (minimal) 
Bayesianism. At the first stage of M, we take interpretations to map stages of a person to 
assignments of degrees of belief to each proposition (probability) and degrees of desirability to 
each proposition (utility). Articulating Òbest accountingÓ as Òmaking as structurally rational as 
possibleÓ, we have a Bayesian proposal for the conditions that a correct interpretation should meet: 
 
! Rationality constraints on beliefs over time: that they are updated by conditionalization on 
experience. 
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! Rationality constraints on beliefs at a time: that they are probabilistic (i.e. satisfy the axioms of 
probability theory).  
! Rationality constraints on final and instrumental desires: that they fit means-end constraints 
articulated by a formal theory of decision (such as that of Jeffrey 1967).  
! Rationality constraints on choices: that the agent chooses to do the thing they most desire to do, 
among the things they think theyÕre able to do.  
 
This gives us a candidate metaphysics of representation: structural radical interpretation 
(Bayesian-style). An interpretation will be correct if and only if it comes closest to making the 
agentÕs dispositions to act (at a time t) dispositions to select the option that maximizes expected 
desirability (according to the assignment at t), and to making the beliefs and desires attributed 
evolve under the impact of experiences in the way the Bayesian demands.  
 
Structural radical interpretation as it stands does not work: perhaps the correct interpretation meets 
all its constraints, but David Lewis (1983) demonstrated that wildly inaccurate interpretations do so 
too. I discuss this in detail elsewhere (Williams 2016), but for present purposes, it suffices to 
picture LewisÕs argument as a black box, which takes as input an arbitrary sensible interpretation 
and produces as output a deviant variation on that interpretation. The two interpretations coincide 
on the agentÕs attitudes concerning what goes on in a local space-time bubble surrounding her, but 
the deviant one represents the agents as agnostic and indifferent to matters outside that bubble. If 
we stick to structural rationalization of actions in the light of experiences, it turns out we cannot 
eliminate deviant bubble-interpretations of agents. Something more is needed. 
 
2.2 Substantive rational interpretation 
Bayesian constraints do not rule out wild initial belief states. Given some such set of wild initial 
beliefs, it will be rational by Bayesian standards to have high conditional confidence that the world 
will explode tomorrow, given the (entirely ordinary) course of experience you have undergone to 
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this pointÑand so rational, after undergoing that experience, to end up believing that the world will 
explode tomorrow. Nor do Bayesian constraints rule out wild final desires, e.g. basic desires for a 
saucer of mud or indifference to what happens to you on future Tuesdays. That is by design: the 
core Bayesian story as articulated above was developed as a theory of the formal patterns that a 
well-run mind should exhibit, not about the particular contents that we have most reason to believe 
or desire. It is, after all, a theory of structural rationality.  
 
Yet thereÕs something crazy about a basic desire for a saucer of mud, or future-Tuesday 
indifference, and about humdrum experience triggering paranoid beliefsÑsomething deeper and 
more alien than whatÕs wrong with commonplace false beliefs or unwholesome desires. In addition 
to constraints of rationality based on formal patterns among our attitudes, perhaps there are 
rational constraints that are sensitive to the particular contents we think or want. These would be 
constraints of substantive rationality.  
 
Substantive radical interpretation is accordingly a metaphysics of content on which the correct 
interpretation of an agent is the one that does the best job of making her substantively as well as 
structurally rational. This is what Lewis (1974, 1992) advocates. Unfortunately, Lewis never told us 
much about what these constraints of substantive rationality were, beyond giving a few examples. 
What metaphysics of representation we get out will depend on what account of substantive 
rationality we feed in. To make progress, we need more information.   
 
The position of this paper is that substantive rationality is a matter of an agentÕs reason-
responsiveness Ñ a measure of the extent to which the agent is responding as they should to 
good normative reasons for their beliefs and action. This can account for the substantive-rationality 
data. An action motivated by a basic desire for a saucer of mud is not performed for good 
normative reason (good normative reasons for the act may exist, but they are not the agentÕs 
reasons, ex hypothesi). There is, I take it, no good normative reason for future-Tuesday 
indifference. Likewise, there is no good normative reason to believe that the world will explode, if 
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oneÕs course of experience is entirely humdrum. This reason-responsive gloss on Òsubstantive 
rationalityÓ links radical interpretation to first-order epistemology and first-order theory of action. In 
so doing, it makes substantive radical interpretation predictive, in a way it would not be if we left 
Òsubstantive rationalityÓ as a mere placeholder. Wider theory gives us a fix on (epistemic or 
practical) normative reasons, and what it is to respond to these reasons appropriately. From this, 
the metaphysician of representation reads off consequences for which interpretations of agents 
best account for their dispositions, and thus (given substantive radical interpretation) for which 
interpretations count as correct.  
 
The way in which substantive radical interpretation (on this reading) favours some structurally 
rational interpretations over others can be illustrated by epistemic inductive reasons (compare 
Pautz 2013, Schwarz 2014, Weatherson 2013). Suppose you have encountered a sample of five 
hundred emeralds after a systematic search, all of which have been green. Post-Goodman (1954), 
we know that structural rationality alone allows many different doxastic responses. With 
appropriate priors, one could recognize all that evidence, and assign high confidence to all 
emeralds being green or instead to all emeralds being grue (i.e. green and first observed before T, 
or blue and first observed after T). Either response can be made perfectly structurally rational by 
assuming the right background beliefs. But normative epistemology may still distinguish the cases. 
According to one such epistemology (call it E), these observational facts give you reason to believe 
that all emeralds are green; they do not give you reason to believe that all emeralds are grue. If E 
is correct, then all else equal, an interpretation will depict an agent as more reason-responsive if it 
represents her as a green-inductor, than if it represents her as a grue-inductor. Substantive radical 
interpretation would then favour the former over the latter (all else equal). 
 
The green/grue example illustrates two aspects of substantive radical interpretation. First, it shows 
how a particular theory of epistemic reasons can generate new constraints on interpretation. WeÕll 
see the pattern repeated below, but in the practical rather than epistemic sphere. Second, the 
inductive case highlights how the normative premises required are not truisms, but can themselves 
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be matter of first-order dispute. A subjective Bayesian should reject the claim that a grue-inductor 
is any less reason-responsive than a green-inductor. The premises about practical normativity 
below will be contestable in the same way.  
 
2.3 Resolution of the stability puzzle 
The underlying strategy for explaining the referential stability of wrongness is very simple: only by 
interpreting W as wrongness do we make the patterns that are built into the conceptual role it plays 
reason-responsive. Combined with substantive radical interpretation, this predicts and explains the 
fact that W denotes wrongness.  
 
Let us work this through for a particular case. Sally has learned that Harry has cheated on his 
exams, and judges that HarryÕs cheating is W. She has also learned that Harry engaged in tactical 
voting, and judges that this is not W. What property does her tokening of W denote? Assuming that 
SallyÕs tokenings of W play the blame-centric conceptual role, IÕll argue that substantive radical 
interpretation entails that W denotes wrong.  
 
First, W plays the wrongness-role in SallyÕs cognitive economy: SallyÕs judgement that HarryÕs 
cheating is W, for example, makes her blame him for that act (since she doesnÕt take him to have 
an excuse). Moreover, her judgement that HarryÕs tactical voting is not W makes her not blame him 
for tactical voting. 
 
Second, according to substantive radical interpretation, the correct interpretation is the one that 
makes Sally maximally reason-responsive, and so in particular must make the way she handles [A 
is W] judgements maximally reason-responsive.  Additionally, I assume what I will call Òconceptual-
role determinism for wrongnessÓ: the interpretation on which Sally is most reason-responsive 
overall is one on which her concept W (which plays the blame-centric role R) denotes something 
that makes the link between her W-judgements and blame most reason-responsive. Absent this 
assumption, it might be that although a given interpretation does best at making the links between 
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W-judgements and blame most reasonable, this is outweighed by other countervailing factors; 
essentially it is the assumption that Òall else is equalÓ.  I discuss the assumption in section 4.1 but 
for now I ask the reader to just take it on board.5 Putting substantive radical interpretation and 
conceptual role determinism together, we derive the following: the correct interpretation of Sally is 
one that makes the link between her W-judgements and blame most reason-responsive.  
 
The third and final element in the explanation is are normative premises that tell us what it takes to 
make the right kind of sense of the blame-link: 
 
1.  A reason-responsive agent would be such that judging that HarryÕs cheating was wrong 
and unexcused makes them blame Harry for cheating (directly and indefeasibly). 
2.  A reason-responsive agent would be such that for any feature F other than those that 
entail wrongness, the judgement that HarryÕs cheating was F (and unexcused) would 
not make them blame Harry for cheating (directly and indefeasibly). 
3.      A reason-responsive agent would be such that: the judgement that HarryÕs tactical 
voting was not wrong, would make them refrain from blaming Harry for tactical voting 
(directly and indefeasibly). 
4.      A reason-responsive agent would be such that: for any feature G other than those that 
wrongness entails, the judgement that HarryÕs tactical voting was not-G would not make 
them refrain from blaming Harry for tactical voting (directly and indefeasibly). 
 
                                                
5
 Some theorists think of conceptual roles as psychological natural kinds, and assume that any concept 
whatsoever comes equipped with its own specific conceptual role. That is not at all the way I am inclined to 
use the term. For me, conceptual roles are no more than a patterns in the way we deploy a concept with a 
certain theoretical interest---in the present context, they label the patterns used to articulate the stability 
thesis. I do not assume there is any topic-neutral way of picking out a conceptual role, and so I am not 
inclined to see the conceptual role determinism thesis as an instance of a more general thesis connecting 
Òconceptual rolesÓ to the theory of reasons. If one were more of a realist about conceptual roles than I (cf 
Peacocke) then you might regard it this way, and I am not opposed to that reading. Just to put a different 
view on the table to temper that way of thinking: one might think of conceptual role determinism as resulting 
from the following stipulation: let us call nothing a conceptual role unless it relates to the theory of reasons so 
as to make conceptual role determinism true (given that stipulation, the key question is whether the blame 
link is a conceptual role in the first place). For now, I simply rely on the condition, and discuss its status later.  
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By (1), an interpretation of Sally on which W picks out moral wrongness (= violating the categorical 
imperative) will make her W-involving dispositions reason-responsive. By (2), only interpretations 
which denote features which entail moral wrongness can do the job. In particular, this rules out 
interpreting SallyÕs concept W as denoting failing to maximize hedons, since ex hypothesi such an 
interpretation will not make Sally reason-responsive. Notice: this is so even if Sally herself were a 
convinced utilitarian, and so mistakenly thinks that to be W is to fail to maximize hedons.  
 
This doesnÕt quite get us to the conclusion that W denotes moral wrongness. For all that (1) and (2) 
tell us, we might interpret SallyÕs W as denoting something more specific than moral wrongness 
which nevertheless entails itÑperhaps the property of being deceptive in pursuit of self-interest. 
That is why we need (3) and (4), which tell us what kinds of properties would make sense of the 
link between SallyÕs negative W-judgements (that she thinks that it is not W to vote tactically in 
elections) and the fact that this blocks her blaming Harry for his avowed tactical voting. The pattern 
of links between SallyÕs negative W-judgements and blame is not reasonable under the over-
specific interpretation of W as deceptiveness in pursuit of self-interest, since on that interpretation 
Sally wouldnÕt have excluded the act as blameworthy in some other way.  The interpretation of W 
as wrongness, however, does make sense of this second aspect of the conceptual role of SallyÕs 
W. 
 
In sum: from these four normative premises, together with substantive radical interpretation and 
conceptual role determinism, we reach the conclusion that SallyÕs concept W denotes moral 
wrongness.  
 
To derive referential stability in full generality, we need to strip away any idiosyncrasies of SallyÕs 
case. The four premises above concern specific acts of cheating and tactical voting. In the general 
case, we need a generalized form, for example in the case of premise 1:  
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 A reason-responsive agent would be such that: for any agent x and act A, the judgement 
 that xÕs A-ing was wrong (and unexcused), makes them blame x for A-ing.  
 
Mutatis mutandis for premises (2-4). The form of the argument would be the same, so it will be 
valid just in case the instance above is. I discuss the soundness of the generalized form further in 
section 4.3.   
 
Another step of abstraction can illustrate something I promised earlier: that the explanation for 
stability I offer does not depend essentially on the working hypothesis about the conceptual role of 
wrongness, or the identity of moral wrongness itself. This is because no matter what how you fill 
this in, we can run the same form of argument by appropriately filling in the following schemata for 
normative premises: 
 
A reason-responsive agent would be such that: for any x and A, as a direct and 
indefeasible result of a judgement that xÕs A-ing is wrong, they will enact conceptual role R.  
 
A reason-responsive agent would be such that: for any G other than wrongness, and for 
any x and A, as a direct and indefeasible result of a judgement that xÕs A-ing is G, they will 
not enact conceptual role R.  
 
The reader is invited to try this out for their favoured conceptual roles/identifications of wrongness.6 
The content of the normative premises that is needed will of course vary, and as flagged earlier, 
                                                
6
 For example, theorists like Scanlon (2007) and Wedgwood (2001) link the conceptual role of wrongness to 
deliberation and preference over how to act, rather than reactive emotions. WedgwoodÕs initial suggestion on 
this front is that moral wrongness has a distinctive overriding role in fixing preferences about x. If we had 
adopted this as our working assumption, then the version of 1 under consideration would state that a reason-
responsive agentÕs judgement that HarryÕs cheating was wrong would make them prefer Harry not cheating 
over Harry cheating. 
You might also think that there is no privileged conceptual role for moral wrongnessÑperhaps both the 
Wedgwood-style role in practical deliberation and the Skorupski-style role in reactive emotion are enacted in 
different communities, different people, or different stages of one person. So long as the appropriate 
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the soundness of the derivation will depend on the first-order issue of whether the normative 
premises that result obtain. 
 
I finish this section with two clarificatory comments, with worries deferred to section 4. 
 
First, the explanation I offer is consistent with the obvious truth that the causal history of a 
particular episode of blame can involve all sorts of property-ascriptions. Suppose again that Sally is 
a convinced utilitarian, and thinks (ex hypothesi incorrectly) that to be morally wrong is to fail to 
maximize hedons. Sally judges that HarryÕs cheating fails to maximize hedons, and this ultimately 
leads her to blame Harry for cheating. The path from judgement to blame here is indirect: she will 
infer from her hedonic belief and her background moral views to the conclusion that HarryÕs 
cheating is wrong, which is what most immediately makes her blame him for cheating. This is why 
the premises have the Òdirect and indefeasibleÓ rider. This is crucial to the plausibility of the 
uniqueness claims in premises (2) and (4).  
 
Second, a structural point: the normative premises are not conditionalized to agents with suitable 
aims, tastes or preferences---it is assumed that any reason-responsive agent whatsoever will 
satisfy them. Theorists such as Railton (1986) and Boyd (1979, 1982, 1988) would reject the 
implicit assumption that (moral) reasons in question are categorical in this way. They argue instead 
that moral reasons are conditional (albeit conditional on features that are deeply entrenched in 
human nature). My argument presupposes that Railton and Boyd are mistaken on this point. This 
is not merely a working assumption (as with my identifications of R and P earlier) but essential to 
the argument as stated. However, if Boyd and Railton are correct and moral reasons are 
hypothetical rather than categorical, an adjusted version of the argument will nevertheless go 
                                                
analogues of (1) and (2) both hold, we can argue that the diversity of roles converge on the single property of 
moral wrongness. Skorupski, for example, argues that an overriding role for moral judgement in practical 
deliberation follows from his blame-centric account of the concept of wrongness, together with conceptual 
truths about the way blame relates to reasons. This suggests that the argument can be further abstracted, to 
argue for something broader even than referential stability. I will not explore this further here however. 
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through. One would alter (1) and (2) by making them conditional on the agent having aim T. One 
would derive a restricted form of stability: for all agents with aim T, and a concept W that plays role 
R, W denotes P. This is not the full, unconditional stability that is my target, but some might prefer 
the package deal of hypothetical moral reasons and restricted stability. It still allows agents with 
utterly divergent views of the extension of W to denote moral wrongness, since sharing aim T is 
prima facie independent of whether one subscribes to Kantianism, Utiliarianism or something else 
entirely. I now set this aside and persist with my original formulations. 
 
PART III: AGAINST REFERENCE MAGNETIC ALTERNATIVES 
Section II presented a version of radical interpretation and argued (given auxiliary first-order 
normative assumptions) that it predicts and explains the referential stability of moral wrongness. I 
believe this to be an elaboration of the metaphysics of mental content that David Lewis endorsed. 
In the recent literature, a Lewisian metaphysics of content which gives pride of place to the notion 
of certain properties being Òreference magnetsÓ, has been offered in explanation of referential 
stability. This section contextualizes my explanation of stability by examining this alternative 
approach, highlighting its problems, and showing how the view endorsed here relates to it.  
 
In 3.1 I present an alternative (ÒfolkloreÓ) version of Lewisian interpretationism. Section 3.2 
presents Dunaway and McPhersonÕs case that this theory explains referential stability. I argue that 
it does not. Section 3.3 shows how the folklore Lewisian idea that certain metaphysically basic 
properties are  Òreference magnetsÓ can be derived within substantive radical interpretation. I argue 
that this should be seen as a special case of a more general notion of a normative reference 
magnet which is operative in my own explanation. 
 
3.1 Folklore Lewisianism  
Lewis offered separate accounts of the metaphysics of mental and linguistic content, and the 
folklore version of his interpretationism is based on his remarks on the latter. The canonical source 
of this version is Lewis (1983)Õs reconstruction and response to Putnam (1980, 1981). We start by 
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supposing that we can identify circumstances in which agents are assenting to certain sentences in 
their public language. From this, we attempt to extract a certain Òfolk theoryÓ the agent endorses. 
We will suppose that this consists of those sentences she is disposed to assent to come what 
mayÑthat she treats as platitudes. The successful interpretation must at least render the agentÕs 
folk theory true. Variations on the theme are possible: for example, we might replace the appeal to 
an individualÕs folk-theory with that of the folk theory implicit in a whole linguistic community.  
 
The constraint of making folk theory true wildly underdetermines reference (that was one of 
PutnamÕs points). Some additional metasemantic factor needs to be introduced to correct for this 
(that was LewisÕs). At this point, the distinctive gambit of folklore-Lewis enters: a metasemantic role 
for metaphysically basic properties. Some properties (maybe the properties featuring in final 
physics) are metaphysically basic or Òperfectly naturalÓ. Other candidate semantic values are 
graded as more or less natural, depending on how close they are to the perfectly natural, and how 
to understand ÒclosenessÓ here is another locus of variation. An overall interpretation of a language 
is graded as more or less eligible on the basis of the overall naturalness of the semantic values it 
assigns to expressions.  
 
So the metaphysics of linguistic representation in question posits a way to rank interpretations of 
language by their degree of eligibility (a measure of the overall naturalness of semantic values 
assigned) and degree of fit with usage (a measure of how much of folk theory they make true). The 
correct interpretation is the one that optimizes both eligibility and fit. 
 
The introduction of eligibility makes fundamental/natural properties Òreference magnetsÓ. All else 
equal, you end up thinking and talking about more eligible properties rather than their less eligible 
rivals, even when the way you use the language could be construed as thinking or talking about 
either with equal charity. This reference magnetism is absolute, a factor that matters to reference-
fixing that is entirely independent of the way we use the language.  
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What has just been sketched is a metaphysics of linguistic content, for public language. It has a 
very different form from substantive radical interpretation, which is a metaphysics of individual 
mental content. But it is possible to adapt the above ideas into an ÒinterpretationistÓ account of 
mental content that would be a rival to radical interpretation. Suppose (following e.g. Field 1978) 
that what it is to believe that p is to have a mentalese sentence S in oneÕs belief-box, and for that 
sentence to say that p. Interpretations of the agent can then take the form of interpretations 
assigning truth-conditions to sentences of the agentÕs mentalese language.  An agentÕs folk-theory 
could be identified, not with a class of public language sentences she will endorse come what may, 
but a class of mentalese sentences that she is disposed to token-in-her-belief-box come what may. 
There is a coherent eligibility-invoking metaphysics of mental content to be given along folklore 
Lewisian lines, and one way we can evaluate it is by looking at its consistency with referential 
stability.  
 
3.2 The folklore and referential stability 
According to a folklore Lewisian, if a cluster of properties are in the running to be reference of ÒFÓ, 
and one is much closer to the fundamental than the others, then that will end up as the referenceÑ
and robustly so, since modest variations in how well that interpretation fits with usage will be 
swamped by the big differences in eligibility.  
 
Dunaway and McPherson (2016) build an account of the referential stability of normative words 
based on eligibility. LetÕs suppose the Kantopians are right about what permissibility isÑit requires 
one adhere to the categorical imperative. These authors argue that the property coherence with 
the categorical imperative will then be highly natural, and so interpretations ascribing it as 
reference of a predicate will receive a boost to their eligibility score.  
 
Turning to the populace of Utilitas, more of their folk theory would be made true by assigning 
maximizing hedons as the property picked out by their term ÒpermissibleÓ, but this charity-boost will 
be swamped (argue Dunaway and McPherson) by the loss of eligibility incurred. Overall they say 
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that even for that population, the interpretation on which ÒpermissibilityÓ picks out coherence with 
the categorical imperative scores best overall when charity and eligibility are traded off.  
 
In order to make this case, Dunaway and McPherson need to justify the claim that permissibility 
itself (whatever it turns out to be) is a lot more eligible than rival properties. That looks like a tall 
order if relative eligibility is determined by definitional distance from the properties of microphysics, 
which is the gloss on Òcloseness to the fundamental propertiesÓ that Lewis seems to endorse. 
Accordingly, they drop this aspect of the Lewisian package. Instead, they propose that the basic 
properties of any serious science count as perfectly natural. Serious science need not be 
microphysics! Indeed, they claim, moral theory itself has this status, and its basic properties (in 
particular, permissibility) thereby count as eligible to the maximal degree.  
 
Schroeter and Schroeter (2013, p.20), anticipating and exploring this sort of response, raise a 
worry: Òif conventional morality, preference maximization, maximization of human flourishing, and 
conforming with the categorical imperative are all basic joints in nature, then being a joint of nature 
wonÕt helpÓ. Their point is that if eligible properties abound, the eligibility of moral permissibility will 
not be a very significant metasemantic filter. The first thing that Dunaway and McPherson might do 
is resist the antecedent of the Schroeter and Schroeter conditionalÑthey claim eligible properties 
must feature in a serious science, and thereÕs no reason they need to grant that e.g. conventional 
morality plays this role, if it does not pick out moral permissibility. But ultimately this style of 
concern is fatal to the Dunaway and McPherson story. Schematically: suppose that E is a 
community who have a concept that plays the internal conceptual role of wrongness, and who take 
this to pick out a property P where (perhaps unbeknownst to them) P plays a basic role in some 
other serious science. Perhaps, for example, maximizing self-interest is a property that has a basic 
explanatory role elsewhere in normative theory (or economic theory, or psychological theoryÉ); 
and E are a community of egoists, thinking that the right action (for x) is that which maximizes xÕs 
self-interest. In virtue of its explanatory role outside morality, the property onto which E have 
latched will be maximally eligible---just as eligible as authentic moral permissibility. In virtue of their 
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egoist moral theory, interpreting Òmorally wrongÓ as failing to maximize self-interest will score better 
than rivals in terms of maximizing truths attributed, and is no worse on the dimension of eligibility. 
So here we have a case where a community has a concept that plays the internal role of moral 
wrongness, but fails to thereby denote moral wrongness itself. That is exactly what we needed to 
avoid.  
 
This is a structural defect, not a puncture to be patched. Whatever makes for eligibility, so long as 
we can find a maximally eligible property of actions that differs from moral wrongness, then we can 
envisage a community who mistakenly take it to be the property that constitutes moral wrongness. 
And it is hard to envisage a story about what makes for eligibility that allows in the normative good 
guys (moral or all-things-considered wrongness) but rules out false friends from natural or social 
sciences or normative theory (being caused by chemical agents ABC, selection by certain frugal-
but-faulty human heuristics, prudentially wrong).   
 
Dunaway and McPhersonÕs intention was to show that eligibility-laced Lewisian metasemantics can 
explain referential stability. IÕve argued they fail. En passant, this establishes something very 
interesting: a novel reductio of the influential folklore Lewisian metasemantics. (This presumes that 
theyÕve made the best case possible for it within that framework, and I think they have.) 7  
 
3.3 Deriving the magnetism of the natural 
What role might metaphysically eligible properties have from the perspective of substantive radical 
interpretation? Pautz 2013 and Weatherson 2013 give us the needed bridge.  
 
Let us go back to the case of induction introduced in section 2.3. Suppose that an agent infers that 
all emeralds are G from past observations of emeralds which were each G. Here are two candidate 
interpretations of the agent: the first interpretation says that G = green; a second interpretation 
                                                
7
 This isnÕt to rule out modifications that significantly adapt the folklore to avoid this worry---see the van 
Roojen below, for example.  
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says that G = grue. Both interpretations have the agent inferring according to the formal pattern of 
enumerative induction. 
 
Reason-maximizing substantive radical interpretation will rate the former interpretation higher than 
the latter if there is normative epistemic reason to believe that all emeralds are green, and no 
epistemic reason to believe that all emeralds are grue in the circumstances described (all else 
equal). It will do so, no matter what the agentÕs other beliefs are, so long as these facts about 
normative epistemic reason obtain irrespective of background beliefs. In sum: given suitable 
auxiliary epistemological assumptions, similar in kind to those we needed to explain referential 
stability of wrongness, projectable properties are reference magnetic.  
 
Now add the further epistemological assumption that properties are more projectable the more 
metaphysically elite they areÑe.g. that there is greater pro tanto epistemic reason to inductively 
generalize on P compared to Q, to the extent that P is more natural than Q (compare Weatherson 
2013). Call this (contentious!) bit of epistemological theory Inductive Metaphysical Privilege. 
Adding this to the mix allows us to argue that, with respect to the interpretation of concepts on 
which we induct, metaphysical natural properties are reference magnetic. This is the suggested 
reconstruction of the magnetism of metaphysically eligible properties.  
 
Suppose we accept this as a reconstruction of a reference-magnetic role for natural properties 
within substantive radical interpretation. And to be sure, we induct on Òmoral wrongnessÓ, and so 
for a reason-responsive agent its referent must be projectable. But lots of properties are 
projectable (a datum that any precisification of Inductive Metaphysical Privilege is going to need to 
save, in order for it to be credible). But moral wrongness (=violating the categorical imperative) is 
projectable, as is failing to maximize hedons and failing to maximize self-interest. The constraint of 
making the agentÕs inductive practice reasonable may make all of these Òmore magneticÓ than 
gerrymandered rivals, but (again on credible precisfications) it wonÕt by itself favour one of the 
projectable candidates over others. That means the reconstructed role for natural properties within 
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substantive radical interpretation canÕt by itself explain stability Ð but by the same token it avoids 
the refutation of the folklore Lewisian account set out above.   
 
To summarize the morals of this section: pace Dunaway and McPherson, one cannot use 
reference magnetism and the folklore Lewisian metaphysics of reference to explain referential 
stability. One can, however, use substantive radical interpretation (with appropriate normative side-
premises, such as Inductive Metaphysical Privilege) to explain why the folklore Lewisian story was 
appealing in application to the kind of descriptive concepts to which it is typically applied. There are 
significant differences. On the relocated account, metaphysically eligible properties will only be 
Òreference magnetsÓ relative to a certain feature of the conceptual role of the target conceptsÑthat 
we are prepared to deploy them in induction. Similarly, in the explanation that I offered above, itÕs 
only because of the conceptual role of SallyÕs W that the property of moral wrongness (=violating 
the categorical imperative) becomes an especially magnetic referent. 
 
Incorporating relativity into a Lewisian metasemantics has been proposed before: Van Roojen 
writes: ÒThe kinds or properties which are more natural for the purposes of physics may not be the 
same as those which are more natural for purposes of biology. The more eligible semantic values 
for oneÕs terms when engaged in the former may or may not be the same as the more eligible 
semantic values for oneÕs terms when one is engaged in the latter.Ó (van Roojen 2006). According 
to van Roojen, there are D-eligible properties that are more eligible for thoughts one has when one 
is engaged in discipline D. This sort of relativization is problematic, however. As Schroeter and 
Schroeter note, engagement in a discipline is prima facie an intentional specification of a stretch of 
thought or talk, and this makes it hard to see how van RoojenÕs particular brand of relative eligibility 
can be deployed within a reductive metaphysics of representation. 
 
The relativity in play according to substantive radical interpretation is of a different sort: it is 
relativity to role in oneÕs conceptual economy.  Consider the explanation of the last section: the 
agent has to be deploying a concept in the right way (e.g. inductively generalizing on it) for 
   Page 23 of 36 
considerations of inductive reason to be relevant at all. There is no general bias towards attributing 
projectable properties as the interpretation of concepts in substantive radical interpretation, as 
there is for the folklore Lewisian. I have the concept ÒgrueÓ, but I am not at all inclined to deploy it in 
inductive reasoning; an interpretation which assigns that concept a projectable property is not 
favoured, indeed, it would be disfavoured, for if ÒgrueÓ referred to a projectable property then by 
refusing to induct upon it I would be out of line with my epistemic reasons. In the same way, the 
particular blame-centric conceptual role that we assumed was characteristic of the concept of 
moral wrongness was central to the explanation of referential stability in section 2. 
 
While referential stability amounts to a counterexample to folklore Lewisian theory of reference 
magnets, according to substantive radical interpretation that account remains a useful model for 
one factor relevant to reference determination for a (descriptive, inductive) fragment of our thought 
and talk. By the same token, it is very misleading if taken as a general model for concepts 
irrespective of their conceptual roles. In the first instance, substantive radical interpretation gives 
us normative reference magnets (and always relative to conceptual role), drawn from the 
properties that populate the theory of reasons. It is only by relying on a thesis about the character 
of inductive reasons that we get metaphysically elite properties into the theory at all. Relative to 
appropriate conceptual roles, wrongness has just as a much a claim to be a reference magnet as 
greenness or charge. 
 
PART IV: REFINING THE STABILITY THESIS 
In the remainder of the paper, I will be considering objections to my favoured explanation of 
referential stability, using them as opportunities to clarify the account.  
 
4.1 Conceptual role determinism 
Conceptual role determinism is the thesis that the most overall reason-responsive interpretation of 
xÕs concept of moral wrongness W is one which makes certain local and specific aspects of their 
mental economy (the link between W-judgements and blame) maximally reason-responsive. This 
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was the assumption that allowed an interpreter to ignore possible trade offs between different ways 
that W is deployed in an agentÕs mental economy, and concentrate on the conceptual role alone. 
 
Some may worry: ÒConceptual role determinism was a premise in the explanation of stability, but 
we havenÕt yet heard anything to explain why it should be true, in general. And if it isnÕt, then we 
are not entitled to claim that referential stability has been established in full generalityÓ . Call the 
following the Refined Stability Thesis: 
 
 Necessarily if an agent has a concept W that plays role R and conceptual role determinism 
 holds for W, then W denotes P. 
 
The objector is pointing out that original stability thesis did not include the italicized restriction, and 
so what the argument establishes is not what was originally advertised. I am going to concede the 
point, but argue that the Refined (not fully general) version of stability is what we should have been 
targeting all along.  
 
First, a case where Conceptual Role Determinism plausibly fails. Consider Suzy, who has a 
concept W that plays the blame-centric conceptual role. However, Suzy in addition has a basic 
indefeasible disposition to infer act A is W from act A does not maximizing.  
 
No single interpretation of W can make Suzy entirely -- practically and epistemically -- reasonable. 
Interpret her concept W as moral wrongness (=violating the categorical imperative) will make her 
W-judgment forming disposition unreasonable. Interpret her W as failing to maximize hedons will 
make unreasonable the way her W-judgments link to blame.  Suzy deploys W in multiple ways, 
and these ways are in tension with one another. WeÕre not entitled to Conceptual Role 
Determinism for SuzyÕs WÑthat would be to assume that it is more important (for maximizing 
overall reasonableness) to make sense of the way W relates to blame than the way that W-
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judgements are formed. I see no principled basis for that assumption. Henceforth, I will take it that 
(suitably elaborated) Suzy provides a case where Conceptual Role Determinism fails.   
 
Suzy has an extremely strange (almost tonk-like) moral concept, in which she treats a personÕs 
failure to maximize hedons as analytically grounds for blaming them. More ordinary moral error 
does not afford exceptions to Conceptual Role Determinism. Since ordinary moral error is 
common, and it will be important that exceptions to Conceptual Role Determinism are rare, I pause 
to examine these cases.  
 
For an illustrative example, consider our interpretee Sally. To be wrong (we are assuming) is to 
violate the categorical imperative, but Sally mistakenly thinks to be wrong is to fail to maximize 
hedons. However, Sally was responsible in reaching this moral belief: she considered a range of 
actual and possible cases, and consulted and argued the issue through with trusted kith and kin. 
Ultimately, weighing her evidence, she endorsed utilitarianism. The contrast with the way that Suzy 
formed her W-beliefs is stark! I say: 
(i) Sally has the reasonable (though mistaken) theoretical moral belief that to be wrong is 
to fail to maximize hedons.    
(ii) Sally has a reasonable direct and indefeasible disposition to blame those who (she 
judges) act wrongly without excuse.  
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), Sally has a reasonable (if mistaken) derived disposition to blame 
those who (she judges) fail to maximize hedons without excuse. 
The first claim is simply an observation about SallyÕs epistemic practice. The second summarizes 
the normative assumptions at the heart of the earlier argument. Having a (derived, defeasible) 
disposition to blame those she judges fail to maximize hedons is inevitable given (i) and (ii) and a 
modicum of rationality. (iii) is surely reasonable, if the underlying (i) and (ii) are.  
 
So I suggest that thereÕs no reason to doubt that conceptual role determinism holds in SallyÕs case. 
To be sure, by reinterpreting her moral concept W so it denoted failure to maximize hedons, we 
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would avoid attributing false beliefs---under that interpretation, she would have reasonable and 
accurate W-beliefs. But the increase in accuracy would come at the cost of making the basic 
blame-dispositions in (ii) unreasonable. In SuzyÕs case at this point, we were faced with a nasty 
trade-off between epistemic and practical reasonability. In cases of ordinary moral errors like 
SallyÕs we have a tradeoff between reasonability on the one hand, and accuracy on the other Ð and 
that sort of trade-off simply doesnÕt threaten Conceptual Role Determinism.8 
 
(The contrast between Sally and Suzy highlights a way in which the exact details of the agentÕs 
mental structures are central to my explanation. Both Sally and Suzy are disposed to blame 
someone, when they judge that that person has failed to maximize hedons without excuse. In 
SuzyÕs case, in effect I say that thereÕs no way of interpreting this so that Suzy is reasonable, since 
that is (ex hypothesi) not a good reason for blaming someone, and itÕs a basic feature of SuzyÕs 
mental economy that she treats it like it is. But exactly the same pattern in Sally is perfectly 
reasonable, I say, since the disposition is not basic, but derived from two individually reasonable 
states.) 9 
 
Let me turn now to the significance of (rare) exceptions to Conceptual Role Determinism. The first 
thing to note is that cases like SuzyÕs show more than that I have failed to derive the original, 
unrestricted, referential stability thesis. If SuzyÕs case is possible, then it provides a 
counterexample to the (determinate) truth of that original thesis. After all, Substantive Radical 
Interpretation applied to Suzy says that the correct interpretation is the one that makes her most 
reasonable. But we said above that there it was not determinately the case that interpreting her W 
                                                
8
 The same thing goes for less theoretically opinionated agents who have no overarching theory that 
structures their moral thinking---the analogues of (i) for an ordinary untheoretical agent will be a range of 
hard-to-systematize context specific judgements of the form: Harry judges that what Z did was wrong on 
grounds it was x, y, z. The analogue of (iii) will be a derived disposition to blame Z for so-acting, on the basis 
that it was was x, y, z. But each instance of (i) is reasonable, then again the induced instances of (iii) will be 
reasonable, and there will be no interpretative pressure to set against the need to make reasonable the 
blame-links in (ii).    
9
 A reader for this journal noted (correctly!) that this opens up a couple of ways to cause trouble for my 
account: either to argue that such nuances (between basic and derived dispositions) cannot make a 
normative difference; or to argue that the moral twin earth intuitions that motivate stability are insensitive to 
such differences, so they cannot play the crucial role IÕm attributing to them.  
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as moral wrongness made her most reasonable. So despite the fact that W plays the blame-centric 
conceptual role in Suzy, it does not determinately denote moral wrongness.  
 
I contend, however, that this is an independently plausible thing to say about SuzyÕs case, a datum 
that a successful theory of reference should respect. So the failure to derive an unrestricted 
referential stability thesis is an excellent thing! The cases that motivated referential stability (and 
were problems for rival accounts) are cases such as Sally (an agent subject to ordinary moral 
error), or the citizens of Utilitas and Kantopia. In all these motivating cases, say I, conceptual role 
determinism holds. The motivation that friends of referential stability had for their universally 
quantified claim was simply that such parade cases are representative of the general case. But the 
generalization is not obviously warranted, and we have seen that cases like SuzyÕs show it to be 
flawed. It is reasonable methodology to use a metaphysics of reference as a tool to predict and 
explain the scope of the generalization. It is in this spirit that I offer the Refined Stability Thesis.  
 
(There is an alternative strategy the interested reader may wish to explore: to add content to the 
conceptual role R itself, over and above the links to blame, from which conceptual role determinism 
can be derived. SuzyÕs W, we would then say, does not play the relevant role R, and so she is 
outside the scope of the thesis anyway. If one found a way to do this, it would elegantly deal with 
these problem cases. (Compare inferentialist harmony constraints and SuzyÕs case to that of the 
unharmonious Òlogical conceptÓ tonk). The strategy is independently interesting, but I see no 
reason to prefer it to the simple refinement of stability above---after all, if conceptual role 
determinism followed from R itself, then the original and refined versions of stability would be 
equivalent!) 
 
4.2 Reasons and reason-responsiveness. 
Some may worry: ÒThe normative premises in the ÒderivationÓ of referential stability are highly 
contentious. They tell us that Sally is being reason-responsive when she reacts to a judgement that 
HarryÕs cheating is wrong by blaming Harry for cheating. But that is a misdescription! The reason 
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that Sally has for blaming Harry for cheating is not the thin property of wrongness. It is the more 
specific wrongmaking features of his actÑitÕs deceitfulness, say.Ó 
 
The objector may elaborate this in various ways. To think that wrongness is a reason (for feelings 
of blame, as much as action) is to Òdouble countÓ reasons (Dancy 2000, 2004). Or perhaps 
ÒSomeone who is moved primarily by overall moral verdicts, such as an actionÕs being wrong, 
rather than the individual grounds for such verdicts, has been said to have a kind of moral fetish, 
rather than being truly morally goodÓ (Darwall 2010, p. 136, alluding to Smith 1994). Finally, one 
might worry that the kind of normative premises I rely on encourage a view of moral psychology 
where there must be Òone thought too manyÓ (Williams 1981)Ñwhere the move from the 
classification of HarryÕs cheating as  deceitful to blame must await the classificatory thought that 
deceit is wrong. 
 
My derivation is innocent of such charges. To start with the Òone thought too manyÓ worry: my 
premises are entirely consistent with thick moral judgments prompting blame. SandraÕs judgement 
that HarryÕs cheating is deceitful can make Sandra blame Harry for cheating, in exactly the same 
direct way that a judgement of wrongness would do (the uniqueness premise I relied on was that 
only features that entail wrongness can directly make a reason-responsive agent feel blame, which 
of course allows for SandraÕs case). Nor can I see anything in the account that gives primacy to the 
thin over the thick in this respect. Some think that the right analysis of thick moral concepts already 
involves the thin concept of wrongness (Elstein and Hurka 2009), and given that view, one might 
be tempted to defend the explanatory primacy of a wrongness-blame conception. But thatÕs no 
commitment of mine.  
 
Turning to the other concerns, I am also neutral over whether being wrong is itself a reason to 
blame the agent. The normative premises that I used in my explanation (like substantive radical 
interpretation itself) are formulated in terms of what a reason-responsive agent would feel/do, and 
not what normative reasons that agent has for feeling/acting that way. I have not taken a stance 
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here on the relation between reason-responsiveness and the theory of reasons. Dancy (2000, 
2004) and anti-Dancians (Heuer 2010, Darwall 2010) will take very different views of this question. 
It is open to anti-Dancians to identify a reason-responsive agent with an agent who 
believes/acts/feels for normatively good reasons. Dancians however think of normative reasons as 
always sparse and specific, and a consequence will be that weÕll often know that there are reasons 
to feel a certain way, without being able to identify what those reasons are.  
 
Suppose Sally knows that Harry has tattled, and knows that this was either spiteful or deceitful, but 
lacks the background context that would let her determine which it is. The thing she does know 
(that it was either-spiteful-or-deceitful) is not itself a normative reason for anything, ex hypothesi. 
Any plausible Dancian theory of reasons will need to accommodate the fact that in SallyÕs 
disjunctive-information situation, she should blame Harry for tattling, despite her inability to identify 
a (sparse/specific) reason to blame him. It will need to theorize what it is for an agent to be 
Òreason-responsiveÓ in cases of limited information. The case of wrongness is analogous. If Harry 
has spitefully tattled, but all Sally knows is that HarryÕs tattling was wrong (which entails that there 
is reason for her to feel blame), as a reason-responsive agent, she should blame him for tattling.  
 
Section 4.3 Interpreting the morally depraved 
A final worry: ÒYour explanation of stability is all very well in cases like SallyÕs, or to sensible 
Kantians or Utilitarians. After all, we take such theories seriously, so itÕs no accident that we are 
happy to class adherents as responding to reasons when they blame someone. We expect them to 
blame people who are worthy of blame a lot of the time, diverging only in recherch cases. But 
what of agents in the grip of an utterly depraved moral theoryÑvalorizing personal honour and 
blaming others who indulge in acts of mercy. They too may have a concept W that is linked to 
blame in the way envisaged. But are they being reason-responsive when they blame Theresa for 
her kindness?Ó 
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In elaboration of the worry, imagine a depraved moral code (the Klingon ethic) built around the 
preservation of personal honour and the elimination of impurity. We imagine that Sarpek the 
KlingonÕs opinions about which acts are immoral diverge utterly from ours, so that any time where 
we are both inclined to classify an act as Òmorally wrongÓ the convergence is purely accidental. 
Unlike my approach in 4.1 I am not inclined to make any further tweaks to the statement of stability 
to exclude Sarpek. Let us assume that he has false, repugnant views specifically about morality.  
 
The Klingon-ethic worry is initially simply a challenge: does interpreting SarpekÕs W as moral 
wrongness make him reason-responsive? The relevant premise in the argument (instantiated in 
the way relevant to SarpekÕs case) is the following: 
 
(*) Any reason-responsive agent would be such that: the judgement that TheresaÕs  
kindness was wrong (and unexcused), makes them blame Theresa for her kindness. 
 
When presenting the argument in section 2, I gave an instance like this for Sally, but then noted 
that to get the general stability conclusion we needed to generalize it to all agents and acts. The 
question here is whether that generalization was legitimate. Here are three rival descriptions of 
SarpekÕs case: 
 
(A) Sarpek (all things considered) ought not blame Theresa for her kindness---such feelings on 
his part would not be reason-responsive. Kindness is not something blameworthy! His 
moral judgements are not reason-responsive either. For example, perhaps (as Harman has 
argued) false moral judgements are morally wrong even if epistemically justified. 11  
                                                
11
 Harman (2011, sec 4) holds that we have a moral obligation to believe relevant moral truths.
 
Applied to this 
case, the Harman position would be that SarpekÕs wrongness-judgement was morally blameworthy (and I 
assume not overall reason-responsive) even if Sarpek were epistemically perfect (cf. p.462). I think 
HarmanÕs case here is most plausible if restricted to cases of morally depraved beliefs, rather than ordinary 
moral error such as that of Sally in 4.1.   
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(B) Sarpek (all things considered) ought to make exactly the moral judgements he does. They 
are the only justified opinion to reach, given his anti-social upbringing and misleading 
experience, and pace Harman epistemic factors determine what one ought to believe. 
Further, though Theresa is not blameworthy---from an objective point of view, she ought not 
be blamed---Sarpek would not be responding to the reasons he has if he didnÕt blame her, 
given his course of experience.  
(C) Combining elements of the above: SarpekÕs moral judgements are reason-responsive 
(given his misleading course of experience) but is not justified in feeling blame towards 
Theresa.  
 
Which description is correct is contested territory in first-order moral theory, and I wonÕt try to 
adjudicate it here (it may vary on different ways of filling out SarpekÕs case). I will trace the 
consequences of each for the present account. Descriptions (A) and (B) pose no threat to the 
wide-scope premise (*). If (B) is the correct, then morally depraved agents fit seamlessly into the 
story given in this paper. (A) is more threatening, since depraved agents will be unreasonable in 
both believing and blaming. Rival interpretations, on which W denotes something other than 
wrongness, could make him epistemically more reasonable, albeit at the cost of being 
unreasonable in linking those judgements to blame. On this description, depraved moral agents 
such as Sarpek might be like Suzy from 4.1. They would thus not pose a new threat to my 
argument, but they would make the Refinement to Stability introduced in section 4.1 more 
significant.  
 
Description (C) is the only one on which (*) itself comes under pressure. The following triad is 
uncomfortable: (all things considered) it is reason-responsive to believe that p, reason-responsive 
to lack sentiment s, and yet reason-responsive to have a disposition to have feel s when one 
believes p. If we hold fixed the first two normative claims, there is pressure to give up the third 
claim (*). On reflection, though, I recommend we should not give it up even so. Instead, we should 
say that it is impossible, in SarpekÕs situation, to be perfectly reason-responsive: he is condemned 
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either to believe inappropriately, blame inappropriately, or have an inappropriately run mental 
economy. If we retain (*) in this spirit, then the explanation of stability applies to Sarpek just as 
before. We make him more reasonable if we interpret him as having genuinely moral judgements 
connected to (*). Further, these moral judgments themselves would be reasonable, so unlike 
description (A), there is no countervailing pressure. He is, admittedly unreasonable in blaming 
Theresa for her kindness, but that doesnÕt look like a flaw that could be removed by judicious 
reinterpretion, so thereÕs no more reasonable rival interpretation in the offing.   
 
It is a theme of this essay that the metasemantic verdicts that substantive radical interpretation 
delivers turn crucially on first-order normative theses---often interesting and contestable ones. The 
case of Sarpek highlights some of these connections. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have offered a metaphysics of mental representation, substantive radical interpretation and 
shown how to derive referential stability (part 2). The rest of the paper has filled out the story, 
either by contextualizing it against related rival accounts or by testing it against objections. The 
take-aways are a refined understanding of the referential stability thesis, an explanation of why it 
obtains, and a sharp sense of the interaction of theses in the theory of content with theses in the 
theory of reasons.   
 
The referential stability of wrongness is a problem for many extant theories of contents. The trouble 
for folklore Lewisianism covered in section 3 is a case in point. One can delay the day of reckoning 
by giving a partial account restricted to non-normative concepts, but ultimately one has to show 
that these partial pictures cohere with a general account of what it takes for concepts of all kinds to 
pick out what they do. I have made a case that substantive radical interpretation passes this test. 
Since I believe in referential stability, I see that as confirmation of this theory. I offer this as a 
contribution to the debate on the correct metaphysics for thought.  
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I also offer substantive radical interpretation as a contribution to the metaethical debate on the 
significance of referential stability. Notice: I have at no point taken a stand on the metaphysical 
status of moral wrongness. One could think of this as a property built up out of naturalistic 
properties, or (as Dunaway and McPherson suggest) a sui generis, elite property of serious ethical 
science; one could equally think of it as a non-natural property, or theorize it in expressivist terms 
(assuming that expressivism is not itself treated as a metasemantic view that competes with 
substantive radical interpretation as Ridge (2014) advocates). Nothing within the account depends 
on the metaphysical status of moral wrongness, but only on its role in first-order normative theory, 
as laid out in Part 2. Those assumptions are not truisms, and they require us to adopt particular 
stances in moral psychology and normative theory, but they are not metaphysical. So the account 
here constitutes a standing challenge to anyone who would try to argue that referential stability of 
wrongness can only be accounted for on their preferred metaphysics of morality. 
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